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Much has been written in the last decade under the heading "redefining
the family." The impetus to reconsider the basic structure of family has
been brought about by significant social changes such as same-sex mar-
riage, the high divorce rate, and the tremendous increase in both cohabi-
tation and nonmarital parenting. These changes have naturally forced
courts, legislatures, and family law practitioners and scholars to revisit the
laws and policies that create, support, reflect, or hinder family structure.
The debate about whether the law should accommodate the changing
family form or stick to its traditional guns is far from resolved. It plays out
differently, depending on the particular social change at issue, the nature
of the family structure presented, and the particular moment in the ebb and
flow of moral debate. The chimerical tone of the debate on many of these
issues-individual liberty versus the survival of civilization, to take the
example of same-sex marriage--often eclipses the real, day-to-day chal-
lenges American families face as traditional family structures evolve and
their boundaries become increasingly ambiguous.
One important set of those challenges involves defining the role of third
parties with respect to children. Third parties, loosely defined as the set of
adults, other than legal parents, with some tie to children, sometimes rein-
force, but often strain, family boundaries. The law alternately gives these
parties rights they can sue to protect and imposes obligations they can sue
to avoid. Litigation over these rights has in turn generated a patchwork of
rules and doctrines that regulate the relationship among parents, children,
and third parties in a variety of contexts.
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The legally defined role for third parties with respect to children is an
important measure of both a family's power and its limits. The law's defi-
nition of family, after all, does not come about as a judicial pronouncement
about what does or does not constitute one. Instead, it is the amalgamation
of the specific rules and doctrines that regulate the boundary between
family and third parties.
This symposium, which John Gregory and I have co-edited, confronts
the issues raised by the presence of third parties in children's lives. Our
goal is to examine relevant doctrines side-by-side in order to fully portray
the pressure imposed on and the support given by third parties to parents
and their children. While some of the pieces tread on familiar ground, this
symposium departs from other "defining the family" compilations by
being both more abstract and more specific. It considers the influence of
third parties generally, regardless of the precipitating reason for the claim.
It thus divorces the definition of family from potentially controversial
challenges posed by specific social issues, such as same-sex relationships
and related claims for same-sex parenting. But, at the same time, the sym-
posium focuses on several specific contexts in which third parties-step-
parents, same-sex coparents, grandparents, nonbiological fathers, and, in
a less obvious way, the state-tend to raise and litigate claims, and treats
each independently.
This symposium illuminates several themes relating to the law's treat-
ment of third parties. First, the articles consider whether the law should
(or does) recognize a continuum of those adults with claims to children, in
which a nonlegal parent might earn more or fewer rights based on his or
her particular relationship to a child and/or a legal parent, or maintain its
customary binary parent/nonparent approach. As several authors note, the
law tends toward the binary approach, reflecting a longstanding suspicion
of "multiple parenthood" and "quasi-parenthood," though underlying
social changes push modem law toward both. Second, our authors con-
sider how to characterize particular third-parties-as legal strangers,
quasi-parents, "near-parents," or simply as parties with a cognizable inter-
est in a child-and the legal consequences that naturally flow from any
particular characterization. By and large, these articles demonstrate that
third-party doctrines tend to reaffirm traditional parent--child relationships,
but expand categories at the margins to include some third parties who act
like parents or serve some parental function. The consent or objection of
a child's legal parent is, in many instances, relevant to this categorization.
Third, these articles consider the scope of third-party rights relative to
those of legal parents and the relative burden of obtaining them.
In this issue, a wonderful and diverse group of commentators illuminate
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these themes while exploring the current legal status of third parties in
specific contexts. The first author, Brian Bix, brings together his well-
known expertise in family law and philosophy together to explore whether
there is any philosophical basis for according third parties any rights or
obligations with respect to children. In Philosophy, Morality, and
Parental Priority, Professor Bix confronts anew the question that is so
central to family law jurisprudence: "Do parents have a fundamental right
to raise their children?" He weaves familiar family law principles with less
familiar philosophical ones to consider the answer. The question is an
important one, since the answer, in turn, dictates the constitutional and
moral permissibility of distinguishing between "family" and "others."
Though Professor Bix finds moral philosophy generally "not up to the
task" of answering the question he poses (since it is still grappling with
much more basic propositions that the law simply assumes to be true), his
analysis leads to the useful conclusion that the rights of nonparents turn
less on high theory than on the more pragmatic question of whether the
law (through its institutional actors) can rationally or reliably distinguish
between "near parents," on the one hand, and "meddling strangers," on
the other. Whether parental priority is absolute must turn, in part, on the
ability to make that distinction.
Professor Deborah Forman, an expert on the constantly changing land-
scape for same-sex parents, contributes Same-Sex Partners: Strangers, Third
Parties, or Parents? The Changing Legal Landscape and the Struggle for
Parental Equality to this volume. In this piece, Professor Forman traces
the evolution in legal recognition for same-sex partners of parents-from
strangers to third parties with only limited rights to equal parents. In the
national landscape, she finds all three of these phases in operation and
thoughtfully weighs the advantages and disadvantages of each. The law's
treatment of same-sex coparents is important to the broader themes of this
symposium because, depending on the particular case, the claims might be
presented with the consent of a child's legal parent or over her objection.
They might involve claims where a parent seeks to have a third party also
labeled a "parent" (occasioned, typically, by the desire for child support)
over the third party's objection. In this context, we thus see head-on the
importance of characterizing an adult as "third party" or "parent." And
Professor Forman's treatment of same-sex coparents, which focuses
primarily on the recent trilogy of lesbian coparent cases decided by the
California Supreme Court, shows that the law in many jurisdictions
has moved beyond the two-category system (parent/nonparent) to a broader
continuum that accords rights and obligations commensurate with the
level of the third party's involvement in creating and rearing a child.
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Ronald Henry, a practitioner and frequent commentator on father's
rights issues, contributes The Innocent Third Party: Victims of Paternity
Fraud to this volume. In this provocative piece, Henry reviews the legal
framework in which paternity is established and argues that the drive to
hold someone accountable for child support has compromised the accuracy
of father identification. Henry takes a critical view of the "business-as-
usual" approach to the establishment of paternity, noting the high per-
centage of default judgments, the lack of legal representation for putative
fathers, and the inadequacy of the procedures used for in-hospital paterni-
ty acknowledgments. He then considers the legal mechanisms that per-
petuate what he terms "paternity fraud," including presumptions of pater-
nity and procedural limitations on the ability of a man to disestablish
paternity despite irrefutable evidence that he is not a child's biological
father. Together these mechanisms combine to transmute third parties
with no connection to children into legal fathers, a status many are reluc-
tant to assume.
Professor Margaret Mahoney, author of Stepfamilies and the Law (1994),
contributes Stepparents as Third Parties in Relation to Their Stepchildren,
an exhaustive look at the legal recognition accorded stepparent-child rela-
tionships. Stepparents of course form a significant category of third parties
with ties to children that are legally created and severed by marriage to a
child's parent. But the practical and emotional ties between stepparents
and stepchildren do not necessarily flow from legal or even residential sta-
tus. Questions about the rights and obligations of stepparents arise not
only when the marriage relationship ends, potentially triggering issues of
custody, visitation, or inheritance, but also while it persists. By and large,
Mahoney argues, the stepparent remains a third-party, even during mar-
riage, and gains the status of legal parent, with rights equal to the child's
parent, only through adoption. But adoption is only possible when the
child's noncustodial parent has given up or lost parental rights or died.
While a stepparent's day-to-day authority within the household is often
determined independent of legal rules, that informal power is useless
when dealing with outside entities such as school and hospitals. Professor
Mahoney examines the "continuing failure" of courts and legislatures to
construct a "clear and consistent legal status for residential, nonadoptive
stepparents." She explains this failure, in part, as a result of the wide vari-
ation in the operations of stepfamilies, which makes a one-size-fits-all
legal status difficult to justify, and the law's "underlying aversion" to
multiple parenting. Together, these factors dictate a default rule of non-
recognition, leaving stepfamilies to operate in a largely unsatisfactory
legal regime that fails to afford appropriate protection to de facto parent-
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child relationships. Professor Mahoney ends with a recommendation for a
stepparent registration system, which would enable stepfamilies to opt-in
to a more expansive legal status. Existing law, however, reflects the tra-
ditional binary approach to third-party rights: a stepparent is either a non-
parent, with only sharply limited rights, or a full adoptive parent with
equal rights (though most stepparents do not adopt their stepchildren).
The legal system has, thus far, "reaffirmed the primacy of biological and
adoptive parenthood."
Professor Naomi Cahn brings a blend of international and domestic
expertise to bear on the question of who represents the interests of chil-
dren in conflicts over parent-child relationships. In State Representation
of Children's Interests, Professor Cahn considers the state's role as a third
party charged with protecting children's interests and the ways in which
the state shapes family boundaries. She first considers the doctrinal limits on
state intervention into families and then develops a conceptual framework
within which to evaluate the appropriateness of particular interventions
based on the relative strengths of the parental and children's rights and the
particular substantive goal being pursued. By way of example, she explores
the role of the state with respect to children in three contexts: abortion
rights of minors, where the state ostensibly acts to protect them; guardian-
ship rights after a parent's death, where the state abstains from acting in
most cases; and, internationally, where the role of the state's parens patriae
power is often carried out by nongovernmental organizations.
Professor Cahn's treatment of the state's role with respect to children
illuminates the boundary against which all families operate-the require-
ment of parental fitness and adequate provision for children. When this
boundary is transgressed, the state's potential third-party role becomes
actualized, which may or may not be in the interest of the children the
state purports to represent. Her examples challenge us to think more care-
fully about the state's power over families.
Finally, Professor John Dewitt Gregory, coeditor of this volume and
coauthor of the widely used treatise Understanding Family Law, revisits
a central third-party issue-grandparent visitation-in The Detritus of
Troxel. An expert in parent-child issues with a longstanding suspicion of
"legal strangers," Professor Gregory considers the medium-term after-
math of the Supreme Court's 2000 decision in Troxel v. Granville. In
Troxel, the Court held that Washington State's "breathtakingly broad"
third-party visitation statute, as applied, unconstitutionally infringed on
"the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care,
custody, and control of their children." The discretion of courts to award
visitation to "any person" at "any time," was deemed too broad to recon-
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cile with the near absolute rights historically accorded parents.
Though much ink has been spilled over the impact of Troxel, Professor
Gregory concludes that it has, in fact, had very little effect on the law of
third-party visitation in most states. Both before and after the Supreme
Court's decision, lower courts have ruled on a case-by-case basis as to
whether a visitation statute is so broad as to compromise the constitution-
ally protected sphere of parental decision-making. Valid statutes fall
somewhere between a pure best-interests-of-the-child standard and a
standard requiring a showing of parental unfitness or actual harm to a
child. The issue of third-party visitation is central to any discussion of
third-party rights vis-A-vis children since litigated cases are premised on
the objection of the legal parent(s). The law's treatment of third-party
visitation claims thus directly implicates fundamental principles of
parental authority and family autonomy. Any successful claim by a third
party for visitation necessarily involves at least a modest infringement on
parental rights and transgression of a family's self-drawn boundaries.
Scholars and practitioners alike should find this symposium of interest.
The articles provide practical guidance for navigating the ever-shifting
terrain of family boundaries and third-party rights, while remaining mindful
of the broader policy issues implicated by any particular claim. Such is the
nature of modem family law-the bread-and-butter of local law practice and,
at the same time, the stuff of public policy debates, presidential campaigns,
and scholarly interchange. This symposium, and the many family law issues
it considers, prove the oft-repeated claim of my colleague and coeditor,
Professor Gregory, that "family law is and has always been the most
dynamic area of the law school curriculum."
